The Necropolitan Sentinel

chi per lungo silenzio parea fioco

Home » Posts tagged "General Petraeus"

The March to Discredit Petraeus Begins . . . Again.

To distract from the failures and complete absurdity of “the one they’ve been waiting for”-in-Chief, the left (and the anti-right right) has begun a steady march to discredit the one man whose leadership will live on in a brilliance Obama can only dream of: General David H. Petraeus. With Petraeus’s new CIA job, it seems they have an excuse to come out with some new-yet-rehashed material. That and they might be feeling a little vulnerable come 2012.

First up, a hack job opinion post published by U.S. News contributor Stephen Glain, which attempts to portray Petraeus as a Presidentially ambitious politician on the sly, doomed to failure because of his pursuit of a “Vietnam-esque” myth regarding small wars. If the facts had been set out straight, Glain would have disproven his own point that “Vietnam was not a winnable war,” rather than trying to bring shame to Petraeus’s name. Additionally, if Iraq had not been ultimately successful in its implementation of counterinsurgency doctrine (“COIN”), Glain might have been able to further tie the idea of “failure in Vietnam” to a supposed failure on Petraeus’s part.

Next, a Huffington Post article by Michael Brenner entitled “I, Petraeus,” seemingly set in tones of hubris derived from Brenner’s opinion of his own opinion. This article draws the conclusion that Petraeus is an effective and powerful leader with diplomatic abilities and a driving ambition to maintain American influence—using a carefully crafted network of personal and professional relationships. At least, that’s the conclusion any Petraeus fan would come away with. While trying to portray Petraeus as a plotting power-obsessed Number Two, the author instead details how effective the General has been as both a commander and a diplomat, exemplifying the new face of today’s military. Brenner retains membership in the “COIN = Vietnam = failure” crowd, though, so it’s difficult for him to say anything nice about Petraeus, a man rightly celebrated for implementing a strategy that Brenner dismisses as invalid.

For reasons that can only possibly be classified as intended to cause annoyance, Diane West over at Andrew Breitbart’s “Big Peace” picked up Brenner’s article, and then rehashed it along with her own commentary on the matter. Because she named her piece “The Petraeus CIA: A Gigantic Conflict of Interest,” you’d think there would be some juicy bits about staffers married to defense contractors, or financial connections to oil reserves in countries we are supposed to be in conflict with. Instead, the whole thing just rants about COIN being another word for “nation building.” If you’re part of the isolationist or Ron Paul wing of the GOP, this piece is for you. Everyone else can just shake their head about the bipartisan need to try and take away from one of the greatest leaders this generation of Americans will ever see.

Continuing with the narrative of attempting to discredit the efficacy of COIN comes a piece at Democracy Arsenal called “The Real Legacy of David Petraeus” by Michael Cohen. Cohen relies on building a straw man, as he has done with previous work, banking on the supposed impression that COIN is less violent than traditional, conventional-style warfare. On the contrary—COIN is a strategy devised to meet the circumstances of an insurgency. It’s neither perfect nor without challenges, and seeing as it’s based on the human element of war, it doesn’t pretend to be seamless or easy. It certainly doesn’t claim to forego brute force, traditional or otherwise. Instead, it claims to be the best strategy to respond to the situation at hand, protecting the population directly rather than merely avoiding them.

“Hearts and minds” isn’t a humanitarian outreach program to help a population feel “warm and fuzzy.” It’s a strategy for winning wars.

Cohen tries to claim that Petraeus made the Iraq and Afghanistan wars longer by implementing COIN, as though under-resourcing our forces or removing our presence entirely and allowing a bloody civil war to reverse all of our gains were better, “quicker” options. In sum, Cohen’s article is just a hit piece taking swipes at anything that served his purpose of minimizing Petraeus’s very real and significant achievements.

Of course, criticism of Petraeus isn’t a new thing at all; however, this recent wave of contempt underscores a trend that already began under the radar; it is an attempt to discredit counterinsurgency itself.

Isn’t it fascinating that in order to find “failure” within a counterinsurgency mission, one has to pretend it exists in a vacuum? Isn’t it convenient to criticize, say, the minimal gains made in Afghanistan implementing COIN when the President never fully resourced a COIN campaign there to begin with?

Each scenario wherein COIN supposedly has “failed” is described as though it were the doctrine itself that was at fault—rather than poor decisions made by the leadership—which were not in line with the doctrine at all. These are cherry-picked to create a false narrative.

This style of argument is especially telling in Cohen’s article when he cites a piece from The Atlantic with a hearsay quotes from discussions between Obama and Petraeus. Petraeus assures the President that a transition to Afghan national forces is achievable within 18 months. Under what conditions? And at what point did the assurance occur? Cohen pushes the quote as though the President asked the question in the context of an operation of 300,000 troops and American civilian leaders that were actually supportive of the idea of victory. The fact is, Obama barely authorized the minimum troop levels needed to operate in a very limited context. This was not a full COIN operation—something also pointed out in the article Cohen derived his referenced quote from, but not mentioned by him in his own piece.

Another narrative that’s worth breaking down is the notion that Petraeus is an ideologue in search of tools to implement some kind of national or global vision. Unlike the current President’s intentions, Petraeus did not go to West Point with the hopes of “fundamentally transforming America” one day. He is a man of talent and intelligence, yes. But he is also a man of hard work, determination, and most importantly, a man who seeks to succeed in the tasks given to him. Iraq needed a new direction, and Petraeus found one that would work. After that, he was on to bigger things as the chief of Central Command, but took a demotion to lead the mission in Afghanistan when asked. This was something unexpected, but accepted by him because as a member of the United States armed forces, that’s what he does.

Why journalists feel a need to attempt discrediting a military leader for doing his job well—an achievement in the best interests of the United States—is perplexing. With 2012 approaching and a failed President attempting reelection, any contenders viewed as a threat are naturally going to be targeted. Thus, the march to discredit Petraeus begins . . . again.

The Media vs. General Petraeus: It Would Be Funny If It Didn’t Suck

You know what sucks about having a Ph.D. from Princeton, being a highly decorated 4-Star General, and leading the world’s most powerful country out of the trenches of a failing war?

Reporters.

In his exit interview with NATO, General David Petraeus made some final comments about the state of Afghanistan as he prepares to leave. The woman conducting the interview obviously missed the message he had already relayed about the capabilities of the Afghan forces in handling their own affairs: They’re doing OK.

Her question had to do with whether Afghans are ready to take over their security–when NATO forces had to help them take out the Taliban suicide bombers that attacked the Intercontinental Hotel a couple of weeks ago.

But see, the good General has already explained the complexities of training foreign forces in numerous forums, and has even spoken on the issue of the hotel attack several times at this point. For this reporter to once again challenge the Afghans’ ability to hold their own – forces trained by leadership under his command, mind you – by taking the cheap shot of mentioning that a few of the guards at the gate of the hotel ran away in response to the first car bomb exploding . . . well that just irked him enough to stop her line of questioning:

“I’m not sure I agree with that…let me address that.”

That must be polite for “Let me correct you on the record before you run with those scissors.” In Bob Woodward’s book, Obama’s Wars, Petraeus had already shown a certain disdain for speaking with the political posturing types. He hated, for instance, talking to David Axelrod, maintaining that he was a “total spin doctor.” So this flare-up comes as no surprise. The next question in the interview showed Petraeus in a more jovial mood, but you can see that the exchange was edited. I wonder how explicitly he clarified things for the nice lady before moving on.

Not that such exercises in futility are anything new to him. After all, someone already picked up, years ago, on the fact that his last name rhymes with “betray us.”

The whole media vs. Petraeus thing would be funny . . . if it didn’t suck.

General Petraeus NATO Exit Interview

How to Defeat al Qaeda: Start a War with Iran

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has finally opened up to reporters about our mission in Afghanistan and in doing so he offered some good news, albeit questionable: We’re in a good position to defeat al Qaeda and now that Osama bin Laden is dead, we’ve just got ten to twenty more guys to go and viola! Al Qaeda kicks the can.

Hold it right there kimosabe.

Is this the product of a David Axelrod creation? No, I’m not doubting the viability of such a proposal since after all, taking away the top 20 leadership positions in nearly any organization would have a crippling effect and further, General Petraeus has given his nod to the claim, citing a “strategic victory” should such targets be killed or captured. But a few points come to mind.

First of all, the sudden positive spin on defeat and the allusion to victory is suspicious given the military leadership’s reaction to the new Afghanistan strategy. Granted, targeting individuals using counterterrorism methods is in line with the new Obama-Biden plan for Afghanistan, which obviously would be the pursued strategy for hunting these terrorists down; however, if counterterrorism alone would have worked as the be-all, end-all strategy to defeating the terror threat in Afghanistan, why would we have 100,000 armed forces over there? In the big picture, if counterterrorism worked alone period, why would counterinsurgency doctrine exist at all? (Psst…it existed long before General Petraeus did)

This is why I mention Axelrod. The message has gone from, “how can we ever win now?” to “hey, this is all we need to do to win!”, and I don’t like it. Which brings me to my next point…

Secondly, how many al Qaeda leaders have we taken out thus far? What I’m getting at is that at this point we only have 10-20 left, but how many did we start with? About 10 to 20. Unlike the counterinsurgency which was just really implemented about a year ago, we’ve been at the counterterror helm for ten years now. Capturing top leadership isn’t like a dodgeball game where we just keep popping mortars until we get them all. These guys have to be hunted down through surveillance, intelligence, and ultimately sending our commandos in to take them out. Or a predator drone. Whichever works best. So if we want to place some estimates on this new claim, we can get one to two top guys every year. Kind of puts a new perspective on that positive messaging, eh?

Then again, there’s a new factor that wasn’t the case while we were hunting down the leadership prior to the capture of bin Laden: there’s been an influx of new intelligence from that raid and, in the world of intel, knowing is half the battle. Of course, that advantage might be canceled out by the intel gathered after 9/11 using our more…politically questionable interrogation methods, meaning we have about the same quality of information to work with as we did after 9/11 and thus, our timeline isn’t shortened any from the raid intel. Oh wait! David Petraeus will now be the CIA chief, which by default means good things. I’m sorry, I just can’t hide my bias!

Oh and there’s just one more point to make: a good number of these guys are in Iran. Yep. If Obama is the new Carter, then that means there’s a potential for another Operation Eagle Claw moment, granted we’d be trying to kill people, not save them of course. But that’s not really the worrisome point. Word on the street is that Iran will respond if attacked.

While Panetta has shown some cajones in claiming that the U.S. will step up to the Iranian threat of their arming insurgents in Iraq, the primary fluff has been centered on their nuclear program while their influence and threat in the region is beyond what they “might” do. What they “are” doing is far-reaching and undermining nearly all of our efforts in the Middle East and now, they’re standing in the way of an entire war effort by harboring our enemies that started the war. Since, for political posturing it seems, the message is that we just have to get these 10 or 20 more guys to “win” the war, we seem destined to toy the line with one more war to get there.

The question then is, how will Iran respond to U.S. targeting and elimination of those enemies when we have to knowingly breach Iranian soil to get to them? Considering that Pakistan is supposed to be our ally and they had a big problem with us killing bin Laden on their soil, we might be looking at having our troops learning Farsi in the near future.

Unless of course, this is just 2012 posturing.